The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
Concerning the meaning of the word “person”, we will see:
1. The definition of person.
2. The comparison of this term with those of essence, subsistence and hypostasis.
3. Is the term person appropriate about God?
4. What it means.
Article 1 — Definition of the person
Objections:
1. Boethius gives this definition: the person is the individual substance of a reasonable nature. However, this definition seems inadmissible. In fact, we do not define the singular; it is therefore wrongly defined.
2. In this definition, the term “substance” is to be taken either in the sense of first substance or in the sense of second substance. If it is a question of first substance, the word “individual” is too much, because the first substance is the individual substance. If it is the second substance, “individual” makes it a false and contradictory definition in its terms; for these are the genera and species that we call secondary substances. This definition is therefore poorly made.
3. In the definition of a reality, we must not insert a term signifying a logical intention. For example, the following statement: “man is a species of animal”, does not constitute a good definition, because “man” designates a reality, while species designates a logical intention. Therefore, since “person” designates a reality (this term in fact means a substance of a reasonable nature), it is incorrect to introduce into its definition the term “individual”, which designates a logical intention.
4. “Nature,” says Aristotle, “is the principle of movement and rest in the being which is subject to it by itself, and not accidentally. ” But the person is verified in beings removed from movement, like God and the angels. It was therefore not necessary to put the word “nature” in the definition of the person, but rather that of “essence”.
5. The separated soul is an individual substance of a reasonable nature, yet it is not a person. It is therefore that our definition fails in some places.
Answer:
The universal and the particular are found in all genres; however they are verified in a special way in the genus substance. Substance, in fact, is individuated by itself; while accidents are so by their subject, that is to say by the substance: we say “this” whiteness, since it is in “this” subject. It is therefore right that we give individuals of the genus substance a special name: we call them “hypostasis” or “primary substance”.
But the particular and the individual meet in an even more special and perfect mode in reasonable substances, which have control over their actions: they are not simply “acted”, like the others, they act by themselves; but actions exist in singulars. Also, among other substances, individuals of reasonable nature have a special name, that of “person.” And this is why, in the definition above, we say: “The individual substance”, since “person” means the singular of the genus substance; and we add “of a reasonable nature”, insofar as it signifies the singular in reasonable substances.
Solutions:
1 . Although we cannot define this or that singular, we can define what constitutes the common formal reason for singularity. This is how the Philosopher defines the first substance. And this is how Boethius defines the person.
2. For some, in the definition of the person, “substance” is put for “primary substance” (which is the hypostasis); and yet “individual” is not too much. In fact, by these terms of hypostasis or first substance, we exclude the universal or the part; because we do not qualify as hypostasis man in general, nor even his hand, which is only a part. But, by adding “individual”, we exclude from the person the reason of aptitude to be assumed; in Christ, for example, human nature is not a person, because it is assumed by a more worthy one: the Word of God.
However, it is better to say that, in our definition, “substance” is taken in a general sense which dominates the subdivisions (first substance and second substance), and that the adjective “individual” brings this term to mean the first substance.
3. Because substantial differences are unknown to us, or even do not have names, we sometimes have to use accidental differences in their place. We will say, for example, that fire is “a simple, hot and dry body”; because proper accidents are effects of substantial forms and manifest them. Similarly, to define things, we can take names of logical intentions instead of names of non-existent things. This is how the term “individual” appears in the definition of person: it designates the mode of subsisting which belongs to particular substances.
4. According to Aristotle, the word “nature” was first given to the generation of the living, that is to say at birth. And as this generation proceeds from an interior principle, the term has been extended to the intrinsic principle of all movement: this is the very definition given by Aristotle. And because this principle is formal or material, we call “nature” both form and matter. But the form completes the being of each thing: we therefore generally call “nature” the essence of each thing, that is to say the very thing that the definition expresses. And it is in this sense that the word “nature” is taken here. Also Boethius says: “Nature is that which informs each thing by endowing it with its specific difference. ” This in fact is the difference which completes the definition and which is taken from the proper form of the thing. It was therefore appropriate, to define the person, who is the individual of a specific kind, to use the term “nature” rather than that of essence, which derives from esse, that is to say of what is most common.
5 . The soul is a part of human nature: and because, while subsisting in a separate state, it retains its natural aptitude for union, it cannot be called an individual substance, i.e. -say a hypostasis or first substance no more than the hand or any other part of the human being. This is why neither the definition nor anyone's name suits him.
Article 2 — Are persona, hypostasis, subsistentia and essentia synonymous?
Objections:
1. Persona and hypostasis seem very synonymous. Boethius says that the Greeks call the individual substance of a reasonable nature hypostasis. Now this is precisely the meaning of the word persona among the Latins. The two terms are therefore perfectly synonymous.
2 . When speaking of God, we also say tres subsistentiae or tres personae. And we wouldn't do it if persona and subsistentia didn't mean the same thing. So persona and subsistentia are synonymous.
3 . According to Boethius, ousia, in other words essentia, designates the compound of matter and form. But what is composed of matter and form is the individual of the genus substance, that is to say, that which is called hypostasis or persona. All these terms therefore seem to mean the same thing.
In the opposite sense , Boethius also says that genera and species only subsist, while individuals not only subsist, but also subsist. Now, from subsistere comes the appellation of subsistentia; and of substare, that of substantia. If therefore the condition of hypostasis or person does not suit genera or species, hypostasis and persona are not synonymous with subsistentia.
5.According to Boethius again, we call matter hypostasis, and ousiosis, that is to say subsistentia, form. But neither matter nor form can be called persona. So persona is not identical to the above terms.
Answer:
According to Aristotle, “substance” is used in two senses. We first call this the quiddity of the thing, that is to say what the definition expresses; we thus say that the definition signifies the substance of the thing. The Greeks call this substance ousia, which we can translate as essentia. In a second sense, we call substance the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus substance. And if we take it in general, we can first give it a name which designates the logical intention: that of “suppôt”. It is also given three names which relate to the thing signified, namely: res naturae, subsistentia and hypostasis, which correspond to three aspects of the substance taken in this second sense. As it exists in itself and not in another, it is called subsistentia, because subsistence is said of that which exists in itself and not in anything else. As it is the subject of a common nature, it is called res naturae, for example, “this man” is a concrete realization of human nature. As it is the subject of accidents, it is called hypostasis or substantia. And what these three names commonly signify for all substances, the word persona signifies particularly for reasonable substances.
Solutions:
1 . Among the Greeks, hypostasis properly means, by its very composition, any individual of the genus substance; but current usage makes it designate the individual of a reasonable nature, because of his excellence.
2 . Just as for God we use the plural: three persons or three subsistences, so the Greeks say three hypostases. But the word substantia which, considering the proper meaning of the term, corresponds to hypostasis, is ambiguous in Latin, since it means sometimes the essence and sometimes the hypostasis. It is to avoid this opportunity for error that we preferred to translate hypostasis by “subsistence” rather than by “substance”.
3. Essence is properly what the definition means. But this includes specific principles, and not individual principles. Consequently, in beings composed of matter and form, essence does not mean only form, nor only matter, but the composite of common matter and form, considered as principles of the species. But it is the compound of “this matter” and “this form”, which is a hypostasis or a person; because a soul, flesh and bones are indeed constitutive of man in general; but “this soul”, “this flesh” and “these bones” are indeed constitutive of this singular man; this is why “hypostasis” and “person” signify in addition to the content of essence, the individual principles: they are therefore not synonymous with essentia in the compounds of matter and form, as was said when treating of the simplicity of God.
4 . To the genera, Boethius attributes subsistere, because, if it is appropriate for certain individuals to subsist, it is as belonging to genera and species included in the predicament substance; it is not that species and genera subsist as such, except in the theory of Plato, which makes the substances of things subsist apart from the singulars. On the other hand, the function of substare suits the same individuals with regard to accidents, which are not part of the definition of genera and species.
5 . The individual compound of matter and form has the function of subject of accidents as its own. Hence Boethius's remark that “pure form cannot be subject”. As for subsisting on its own, it derives from its form. This does not occur in an already subsisting thing: it gives actual being to matter so that the individual can subsist. This is why Boethius relates hypostasis to matter, and ousiosis or subsistentia to form: this is because matter is the principle of the substare, and form, the principle of the subsistere.
Article 3 — Is it appropriate to use the term “person” when talking about God?
Objections:
1 . Dionysius writes: “We must absolutely deny ourselves the boldness of saying or thinking anything about the supersubstantial and hidden Deity, outside of the terms whose expression is given to us by the Holy Scriptures.” Now the name of person is not used in the Holy Scriptures of the New or the Old Testament. We should therefore not use this word about God.
2.Boethius tells us: “The word person seems to derive from the masks which represented human characters in comedies or tragedies: persona in fact comes from personare (to resonate); because the sound, rolling in the concavity of the mask, is amplified. The Greeks call these masks prosôpa (faces), because they are placed on the face and in front of the eyes so that they hide the face.” Now this cannot be appropriate in God, except by metaphor. Therefore no one's name is applicable to God except metaphorically.
3 . Every person is a hypostasis. But the term hypostasis does not seem to suit God, because, according to Boethius, it designates the subject of accidents; and there are no accidents in God. S. Jerome even says that, “in this word hypostasis, a venom is hidden under the honey”. The term person must therefore not be said of God.
4 . Finally, if a definition cannot be attributed to a given subject, neither can the defined term. However, the definition given above of the person does not seem to suit God. First, because reason implies discursive knowledge; and it has been shown that this does not suit God; we cannot therefore say that God is “of a reasonable nature”. Then, because God cannot be called “individual” substance; for the principle of individuation is matter, and God has no matter. Furthermore, God does not support accidents, to be called “substance”. We must therefore not attribute to God the name of anyone.
In the opposite sense , the Creed of S. Athanasius says: “One is the person of the Father, another that of the Son, another that of the Holy Spirit. ”
Answer:
The person signifies that which is most perfect in all nature: namely, that which subsists in a reasonable nature. Now everything that says perfection must be attributed to God, because his essence contains in itself all perfection. It is therefore appropriate to attribute to God this name “Person”. Not, it is true, in the same way as we attribute it to creatures; it will be in a more excellent mode, as is the case with the attribution to God of the other names given by us to creatures; this was explained above, in the treatise on divine names.
Solutions:
1. It is true that we do not find the name of person applied to God in the Scriptures of the Old or New Testaments. But we find there many times affirmed by God what this name means; in other words, that God is of himself to the supreme degree, and that he is sovereignly intelligent. And if it were necessary, to name God, to stick literally to the words that Holy Scripture applies to God, we could never speak of him in any language other than that in which the Scripture of the Ancient or of the New Testament. But we were forced to find new words to express the traditional faith concerning God: because we had to enter into discussion with the heretics. This is not a novelty to be avoided, since it is not a profane thing; it does not disagree with the meaning of the Scriptures. Now what the Apostle prescribes (1 Tim 6:20) is to avoid “profane novelties in words”.
2 . If we refer to the origins of the word, the name of person, it is true, does not suit God; but if we give it its authentic meaning, it is indeed suitable to God par excellence. Indeed, as in these comedies and tragedies famous characters were represented, the term person came to mean people constituted in dignity; hence this usage in churches of calling “persons” those who hold some dignity. Some define the person for this: “A hypostasis distinguished by a property relating to dignity. “Now it is a high dignity to subsist in a reasonable nature; therefore we give the name of person to any individual of this nature, as we have said. But the dignity of the divine nature surpasses all dignity; it is therefore above all to God that the name of person is appropriate.
3 . The name hypostasis also does not suit God in its etymological sense, since God does not support accidents; but it suits it in its authentic sense of “subsisting reality”. S. Jerome has indeed said that a venom was hidden under this word: because, before its meaning was fully known to the Latins, the heretics misled the simple with this word, by leading them to confess several essences as they confessed several hypostases: this, thanks to the fact that the term “substance”, which is the literal translation of the Greek word “hypostasis”, is commonly taken among the Latins in the sense of “essence”.
4. We can say that God is of a “reasonable” nature, in the sense that “reason” evokes not discursive reasoning, but intellectual nature in general. For its part, “individual” undoubtedly cannot suit God insofar as it evokes matter as a principle of individuation; it only suits him as evoking incommunicability. Finally “substance” suits God insofar as it means self-existence. However, some say that the above definition, given by Boethius, does not define person in the sense that we speak of Persons in God. Thus Richard de Saint-Victor, wanting to correct this definition, said that the person, when it comes to God, is “an incommunicable existence of divine nature”.
Article 4 — What does the name Person mean in God?
Objections:
1. “When we say: the person of the Father,” writes S. Augustine, “we are not saying anything other than the substance of the Father; for it is in himself that he is said to be “person,” and not in relation to the Son. ”
2 . The quid question asks about the essence. Now, according to S. Augustine, when we say: “There are three who testify in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit,” if we ask: three what? (quid tres?), we answer: three people. This personal name therefore means essence.
3 . What the name means, according to the Philosopher, is its definition. Now we define the person: an individual substance of a reasonable nature, as we have said. So the name of person really means the substance.
4 . When it comes to men and angels, person does not mean a relationship, but something absolute. If therefore, in God, this name signified relationship, it would be equivocally attributed to God, to men and to angels.
On the contrary , Boethius says that every name concerning Persons signifies a relationship. But no name concerns them more closely than that of “no one”. So the noun “person” means a relationship.
Answer:
What creates difficulty for the meaning of this term in God is that it is said in the plural of the Three, a condition which sets it apart from essential nouns; and yet it is not attributed relatively, like the terms which signify a relation. Some have therefore thought that the term “Person”, by its own content, means purely and simply the essence in God, just like the word “God” or that of “Wise”; but because of the insistence of the heretics, it was accommodated by conciliar decision to take the place of relative nouns, especially in the use in the plural or with a partitive term: “The three Persons” for example, or “Other is the person of the Father, another that of the Son.” But this explanation seems insufficient. For, if the word “person”, by virtue of its proper meaning, does not mean anything other than the essence in God, we would not have put an end to the slanders of the heretics by saying “Three Persons”; on the contrary, they would have been given the opportunity for more serious slander.
This is why others have said that the word “person” in God means both essence and relationship. Some say that it directly signifies the essence, and indirectly the relation; for this reason that “person” is as if we were saying per se una (one by itself); now, unity concerns the essence, while “by itself” implies the relation in indirect construction. And in fact, we grasp the Father as subsisting in himself, as distinct from the Son by his relationship. Others, on the other hand, have said that it directly signifies the relationship and indirectly the essence, for this reason that, in the definition of the person, “nature” comes as an indirect complement. And the latter came closer to the truth.
To clarify this question, we will start from the following consideration. A thing can enter into the meaning of a less general term, without entering into the meaning of the more general term: thus “reasonable” is included in the meaning of the word “man”, but it is not included in that of the word " animal ". Also, looking for the meaning of the term “animal”, and looking for that of this case of animal that is “man”, that makes two things. Likewise, it is another thing to look for the meaning of the word “person” in general, and another thing to look for that of “Divine Person”.
In fact, the person in general means, as has been said, the individual substance of a reasonable nature. Now, the individual is that which is undivided in itself and distinct from others. Consequently, the person, in any nature, signifies what is distinct in that nature. Thus, in human nature, it signifies those flesh, bones and soul, which are the individuating principles of man. If it is true that these elements do not enter into the meaning of “the person”, they do enter into the meaning of “the human person”. Now in God, as we have said, there is no distinction except on the basis of original relationships. On the other hand, the relationship in God is not like an accident inherent to a subject; it is the divine essence itself; consequently it is subsistent in the same way as the divine essence. As therefore the deity is God, so also the divine paternity is God the Father, that is, a divine Person. Thus “the divine Person” signifies the relation as subsistent: in other words, it signifies the relation by way of substance, that is to say, of hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature (although what subsists in the divine nature is nothing other than the divine nature).
From the above, it remains true that the name “Person” directly signifies the relation, and indirectly the essence: the relation, I say, not as a relation, but signified by way of hypostasis. It also remains true that the Person directly signifies the essence and indirectly the relationship, if we consider on the one hand that the essence is identical to the hypostasis and, on the other hand, that the hypostasis in God is defines and means “distinct by relation”; which places the relation, signified as relation, this time, in indirect determination in the definition of the Person. We can also say that this meaning of the name “Person” had not been grasped before the slander of the heretics; we therefore only used this term in the sense of an absolute attribute taken from among the others. But subsequently the word “Person” was applied to signify the relative, because of its powers of signification; that is to say, if it designates the relative, it is not a pure effect of use, as the first opinion thought, it also has to do with its own meaning.
Solutions:
1 . The word “person” is attributed absolutely, and not relatively, because it signifies the relation, not by mode of relation, but by mode of substance, meaning hypostasis. This is why S. Augustine says that it means essence. In God, in fact, the essence is identical to the hypostasis: no distinction in him between what is and what is.
2. The question what? sometimes inquires about what the definition means; thus, when we ask: Quid sit homo? (What is man?), we answer: He is a reasonable and mortal animal. Sometimes she also asks about the henchman; so when we ask: Quid natat in mari? (What swims in the sea?), we answer: it's the fish. And it is in this last sense that the question: Quid tres? (three what?) got this answer: three People.
3 . The concept of individual substance, that is to say distinct and incommunicable, implies the relation if it is God; we have just exposed it.
4 . A general term is not equivocal simply because less universal terms have different definitions. For example, the horse and the donkey do not have the same specific definition; and yet they unequivocally verify the name animal, because the generic definition of “animal” suits them both. Therefore, if it is true that the relationship enters into the meaning of “Divine Person”, without entering into that of “angelic or human person”, it does not follow that the term “person” is equivocal. It is also not univocal either; nothing can be attributed unequivocally to God and to creatures as we saw above.
